Semiconductor Supply Chain and Geopolitics encompasses the global structure, geographic concentration risks, and government policy interventions shaping where and how semiconductors are designed, manufactured, packaged, and tested — a topic of critical importance as semiconductor supply chain resilience has become a national security and economic competitiveness priority for major economies.

Current Supply Chain Geography:

Design:        USA (52% revenue) — Qualcomm, Apple, NVIDIA, AMD, Broadcom
               China (12%) — HiSilicon, UNISOC
               EU, Japan, others

Fabrication:   Taiwan (65% foundry) — TSMC (60% alone)
               Korea (18%) — Samsung
               China (8%), USA (6%), EU, Japan

Leading-Edge:  Taiwan (TSMC 92% of <10nm production)
               Korea (Samsung 8%)
               USA, EU, Japan: effectively 0% at leading edge

Equipment:     Netherlands (ASML — 100% EUV monopoly)
               USA (Applied Materials, Lam, KLA)
               Japan (TEL, Screen, Advantest)

Packaging:     Taiwan (ASE 25% market), China, Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam

Materials:     Japan (photoresists, specialty chemicals, Si wafers)
               USA (gases, CMP slurries)
               Germany (chemicals), Korea

Key Concentration Risks:

• TSMC single-point-of-failure: >90% of the world's most advanced chips come from one company on one island 100 miles from mainland China
• ASML EUV monopoly: One company in the Netherlands makes the $380M lithography machines essential for advanced nodes
• Neon gas: 50%+ from Ukraine (pre-war) — semiconductor-grade gas supply disrupted
• Advanced packaging: Heavily concentrated in Taiwan

Government Interventions:

CHIPS Act Implementation (USA):

• TSMC Arizona: $65B for 3 fabs (4nm, 3nm, 2nm) — first production ~2025
• Samsung Taylor TX: $17B for advanced logic fab
• Intel: $100B+ across Ohio, Arizona, Oregon, New Mexico
• Micron: $40B+ for memory fabs in Idaho and New York
• Total: >$200B committed private investment, ~$39B CHIPS grants allocated

Export Controls:

US export controls on China (October 2022 rules, updated 2023-2024) restrict:

• Advanced GPUs (A100/H100 and beyond) — performance thresholds
• EUV lithography equipment (ASML blocked)
• Advanced DUV immersion tools (added 2024)
• US-person restrictions (Americans cannot support advanced China fabs)
• Equipment parts and service restrictions

China's response: accelerating domestic alternatives (SMIC 7nm without EUV — likely using multi-patterning DUV), massive investment in mature-node capacity (28nm+), and developing indigenous equipment.

The semiconductor supply chain has transformed from a purely commercial matter to a geopolitical priority — with over $500 billion in government investments globally reshaping the geography of chip manufacturing, the next decade will determine whether the industry achieves meaningful diversification or whether critical concentration risks persist in the face of escalating technology competition.